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This article highlights the strict association met in the literature between the adaptive expectations assumption 
and the correct running of the monetary model of hyperinflation. A complete resolution of the model is carried 
out under the adaptive expectations hypothesis. It is shown that the assumption of adaptive expectations is not 
sufficient to ensure the validity of the model for the explanation of monetary hyperinflation. This result raises the 
question of the field of validity of this model already posed by the introduction of rational expectations. The 
possibility  of  development  of  self-generating  hyperinflationary  bubbles  strengthens  the  relevance  of  this 
question. 
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Hyperinflation is an unstable dynamic process where inflation speeds up. The modelling of 
hyperinflation  started  with  the  seminal  work  of  Cagan  (1956)  within  the  New  Quantity 
Theory of Money. Cagan defined hyperinflation as a speeding up inflation process where 
inflation  rates  exceed  50%  monthly.  He  considered  hyperinflationary  episodes  as  purely 
monetary  phenomena  that  can  be  studied  by  focusing  only  on  the  money  market.  This 
approach implies that the model deals with monetary hyperinflation where both inflation and 
money growth rates accelerate and explode. Cagan proposed the explanation of monetary 
hyperinflation as the result of an excessive real fiscal deficit financed through money creation 
or  seigniorage  revenues.  Nevertheless,  this  first  modelling  couldn’t  produce  monetary 
hyperinflation  paths.  Later,  Evans  and  Yarrow  (1981)  and  Bruno  and  Fischer  (1987) 
completed the model by modelling the money supply process. However, since the articles of 
Buiter (1987) and Kiguel (1989) it is known that in some of its configurations the model is 
unable to support the standard explanation of hyperinflation, especially under the assumption 
of rational expectations. 
 
The possible failure of the monetary model of hyperinflation is an important issue. The model 
provides  the  theoretical  framework  for  stabilization  policies  and  for  many  empirical 
investigations  on  hyperinflationary  experiences.  Empirical  investigations  relying  on  the 
theoretical framework of the monetary model of hyperinflation have been being published on 
a regular basis. Recently, there were Slavova (2003) on the Bulgarian experience of 1996-  2 
1997,  Choudhry  (1998)  on  the  last  Russian  experience  during  the  Nineties,  Petrovic  and 
Vujosevic (1996), Bogetic et al (1999) or Petrovic and Mladenovic (2000) on the Serbian 
experience during the decade 90, or Georgoutsos and Kouretas (2004) on the famous German 
experience  in  the  early  Twenties.  Then,  the  possible  failure  of  this  model  implies  that 
empirical studies relying on the monetary model of hyperinflation should be very careful 
which configuration of this model they deal with. This issue is of great importance since the 
majority of empirical studies rely on a rational expectations version of the model. 
 
The  monetary model of  hyperinflation has a relatively  simple  structure and  a rich set  of 
solutions. However, the wealth of possible solutions of this model isn’t an asset for it. On the 
contrary,  it  results  in  restricting  the  field  of  validity  of  the  model  for  the  analysis  of 
hyperinflation. The introduction of rational expectations into the model has often been at the 
origin of these validity problems as shown in Buiter (1987) or Kiguel (1989). Therefore, it 
comes out that the monetary model of hyperinflation is usually associated in the literature 
with the adaptive expectations assumption. This arises since the study of this configuration 
allows  several  authors  like  Bruno  and  Fischer  (1987,  1990),  for  instance,  to  support  the 
highlighting and the explanation of monetary hyperinflation. In the same spirit, Evans (1995) 
stressed that the assumption of adaptive expectations is a sufficient condition to ensure the 
validity of the model. 
 
The present article aims at highlighting the strict association met in the literature between the 
assumption  of  adaptive  expectations  and  the  correct  running  of  the  monetary  model  of 
hyperinflation. With that aim, a complete resolution of the model is carried out under the 
assumption of adaptive expectations. This completes the analyses made in Bruno and Fischer 
(1987, 1990), taken up again in Blanchard and Fischer (1990) and still recently in Walsh 
(2003). The main purpose of the paper is to show that the validity of the model doesn’t 
depend on the way in which inflationary expectations are formed. The crucial issue is the 
presence of a sufficiently large adjustment lag of real cash balances to actual inflation rates. 
 
The analysis of the dynamics of the model carried out in the second section of the article leads 
to the distinction of two configurations under the adaptive expectations hypothesis. The first 
configuration, which is thoroughly analysed in the third section, corresponds to a relatively 
slow adjustment of inflationary expectations. The second configuration, not explored in the 
literature, corresponds to a relatively fast adjustment of inflationary expectations. The fourth 
section carries out the thorough treatment of it. The results obtained in the fourth section 
justify a deeper investigation of this case from the point of view of economic policy theory in 
fifth section. Section 6 concludes the article. 
 
 
2 The model 
 
The  demand  for  real  cash  balances  is  the  fundamental  equation  of  the  model.  During 
hyperinflations  real  variables  such  as  the  real  rate  of  interest  and  real  output  may  be 
reasonably treated as constant since all the action involves money and prices. Therefore, since 
the demand for real cash balances depends on the nominal interest rate, it will depend only on 
the expected rate of inflation. Following Cagan (1956), we use a semi-logarithmic demand for 
real cash balances, known as Cagan demand for money. Then, expressed in real termsMr
d, the 
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In this equation p
e represents the expected rate of inflation, a and g              are parameters. The role 
of constant g  is to describe the influence of real income and real interest rate, which are 
supposed to be constant in this analysis. The positive constant a, the semi-elasticity of money 
demand, describes the decreasing demand for real cash balances with respect to expected rate 
of inflation.  In order to make more apparent the semi-logarithmic shape of the Cagan demand 
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where p is the actual rate of inflation. We follow Cagan in using continuous time so that a 
variable with an upper point represents its derivative with respect to time. The parameter b, 
called « expectation coefficient » by Cagan, captures the speed of adjustment of expectations 
to observed actual inflation. A low b implies that expectations respond slowly to inflation 
forecast errors. A high b implies that expectations respond quickly to inflation forecast errors. 
At the limit where b tends to an infinite value we retrieve the perfect foresight case, which is 
in this determinist model equivalent to rational expectations hypothesis. 
 
Concerning the adjustment between real cash balances and desired real cash balances we 
assume, like Cagan, instant clearing of the money market. Therefore, we have always equality 
between the level of holdings of real cash balances,M
P , and the level of desired real cash 
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The model description is completed by stating the process explaining the money supply. The 
real fiscal deficit d is fully financed through money creation. Therefore, the process of money 










  .          (4) 
 
As money creation from public authorities implies a transfer of real resources from the private 
sector  to  the  government,  seigniorage  revenues  can  be  interpreted  as  the  outcome  of  a 
particular tax, the inflation tax. As long as the money issued by the public authorities is 
desired and used by private agents, the latter won’t escape this inflation tax. 
The later four equations make the monetary model of hyperinflation. In order to simplify the 
notations we omit, from there on, to write the index of time t to all variables. 
 
From equation (4), the government budget constraint can be restated as follows: 






  .          (5) 
 
Following equation (3) describing the instant clearing of money market and according to the 
semi-logarithmic form of the demand for real cash balances given by (1), the government 
budget constraint can be re-written as: 
 
d = q ×e
g -ap
e
  ,         (6) 
 
where  q  is the growth rate of the nominal stock of money. The constraint (6) can also be 






logq + g - logd ( )  .        (7) 
 
The latter expression of the government budget constraint represents the equation of a curve 
IS in the framework (q, pe), named “iso-seigniorage curve”. The curve IS derived from (7) 
shows, for each rate of money growth, the expected rate of inflation needed to generate the 
required seigniorage revenues given by d. The iso-seigniorage curve IS represents the path 
followed by the economy. According to the logarithmic shape of equation (7), the curve IS is 




Further understanding of the model requires the specification of the dynamics of the model. 
By differentiating equation (3) with respect to time we obtain: 
 
e q p ap - = - ￿   .        (8) 
 









￿   .      (9) 
 
This latter equation shows the dynamic properties of the economy in the framework (q, pe). In 
a steady-state equilibrium where the stock of real cash balances is constant we have: 
 
p
e = q = p  ,          (10) 
 
At this stage any further investigation of the dynamics of the model requires the distinction of 
two cases: 
 
•  Case  1-ab > 0  or  b < a
-1  ,  corresponding  to  the  case  where  expected  inflation 
adjusts relatively slowly to actual inflation. This is the case usually presented and treated in 
the literature. 
 
•  Case 1 - ab < 0 or b > a
-1 , corresponding, on the contrary of the previous case, to a 
case where expected inflation responds relatively quickly to inflation forecast errors. This   5 




3 Adaptive expectations and hyperinflation 
 
In this section we examine the traditional version of the model corresponding to a relatively 
slow adjustment of expected inflation to actual inflation. This is the configuration generally 
presented in the literature as in Walsh (2003). Focusing on the case 0 < b <a
-1 shows that 
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The intersection of the 45° line with the curve IS determines, in the framework (q, pe), the 
steady-state  equilibrium  points  of  the  economy.  The  existence  of  steady-state  equilibria 
depends of the size of the real fiscal deficit d. To see this, one should carry out the following 
analysis.  In  the  framework  (q, pe)  the  steady-state  equilibrium  of  the  economy  occurs 
whenq = p





logq +g - logd ( ) .        (12) 
 
Therefore, determining the steady-state equilibrium requires solving equation (12). To solve 





logq + g -logd ( )- q    ,        (13) 
 
with the aim to determine the number of solutions of D(q) =0 representing the number of 
steady-state equilibria. Function D(q) is defined on  0; +¥ ] [ and its limits at boundaries are 





  .        (14) 
 
Then, the variations of D(q)are given by: 
 
1 ' ( ) 0 according to q q a
-
> < ￿ ￿
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  .    (15) 
 
According to the behaviour of function  D(q), it appears that the existence of solutions to 
D(q) =0 will depend on the value of D(a
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If the value of  D(a






D(q) =0 has two solutions meaning that there are two distinct steady-state equilibria. For a 
zero value of D(a
-1), that is for d=d*, there is a single steady-state equilibrium. If the value 
of D(a
-1) is strictly negative, that is when fiscal deficit exceeds d*, there isn’t any steady-
state equilibrium for the economy. 
 
These  results come from  the existence  of  a  Laffer  curve for  the  steady  state  seigniorage 
revenues. In the case of the Cagan demand for money, the curve representing seigniorage 
revenues is a bell-shaped curve. That’s why it is called a “Laffer curve” for the seigniorage 
revenues. Therefore, there is a maximal level of real deficit, d , consistent with a stationary 
inflation rate, on one hand, and the possibility for the government to finance the same real 
budget deficit with two different stationary inflation rates, one called “low” and the other 
“high”, as long as the real budget deficit remains lower than d , on the other hand. For the 
economy it means that there is the possibility of two different steady-state equilibria, one of 
“low inflation” and the other of “high inflation”. There is duality of steady-state equilibrium 
as long as the budget deficit remains lower than d . 
 
Assessing  d   can  be  done  in  the  following  way.  Calling  R  the  steady-state  amount  of 
seigniorage revenues, the value of d  is the maximal value of R. Using (6) and (10) this value 
is given by: 
 
d = max
p R(p) { }= R
* = max
p p×e




g -1  ,       (17) 
 
and is exactly the value d* showed previously: d =d*. The value of the stationary inflation 
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Figure 1: Laffer curve for the steady state seigniorage revenues   7 
 
Figure  1  shows  the  “Laffer  curve”  for  the  stationary  seigniorage  revenues.  The  issue  of 
duality of the steady-state equilibrium clearly appears and so does the issue of financing a real 
budget deficit higher than d* like d1 for instance. As can be seen on figure 1, there isn’t any 
possibility to finance such a higher deficit with a stationary inflation rate. Therefore, this 
leaves the place for a non stationary way. 
 
The iso-seigniorage curves ISo and IS1 represented in figure 2 correspond, respectively, to the 
budget deficits do and d1 such that: 
 
*
0 1 d d d < <   .         (19) 
 
The intersection of the 45° line with the curve ISo determines two steady-state equilibria, 
points A and B. The point B, the high inflation steady-state equilibrium, is unstable whereas 
A, the low inflation equilibrium, is locally stable. The public authorities are able to finance 
their real budget deficit do with two stationary inflation rates ￿A and ￿B. If the budget deficit is 
d1  there  isn’t  any  steady-state  equilibrium  because  the  seigniorage  revenues  that  can  be 
reached with a stationary inflation rate are below the government needs. Financing this budget 
deficit  will  put  the  economy  on  a  non  stationary  path.  Figure  2  illustrates  this  point  by 
showing  the  path followed  by  the  economy  on  the  curve  IS1  where  inflation and money 
growth rates escalate and explode. 
 
 
Figure 2: Monetary hyperinflation dynamics 
 
Consider  the  case  of  an  economy  in  steady-state  equilibrium  A  on  figure  2.  At  this 
equilibrium  point  the  government  succeeds  to  finance  its  real  budget  deficit  do  through   8 
seigniorage revenues with a constant inflation rate of ￿A. At point A actual and expected 
inflation rates and nominal stock of money growth rate are all equal: 
 
A A p q =   .          (20) 
 
Suppose that the budget deficit is increased to the level of d1. The government needs a higher 
level of seigniorage revenues. Since the demand for real money balances depends on expected 
inflation, and because the adjustment process does not allow the expected inflation rate to 
jump immediately, the higher deficit can be financed by an increase in the rate of money 
growth. In terms of figure 2, since the expected inflation rate remains at its level immediately 
after the increase of the deficit, the higher monetary growth makes the economy jump from 
point A to point C on the new iso-seigniorage curve IS1 associated with the higher deficit. 
 
An accelerating money supply growth enables, at this first stage, the public authorities to 
generate the required amount of seigniorage revenues. Since the level of desired real cash 
balances has not changed yet, the sudden rise of the nominal stock of money implies, through 
the  adjustment  of  real  cash  balances  holdings  to  its  desired  level,  an  increase  in  actual 
inflation rate in the economy (this doesn’t appear directly in figure 2 since the framework is 
(q, pe)). 
 
In a second stage, as expected inflation adjusts gradually to higher actual inflation, demand 
for real cash balances starts to decline. This decline of real cash balances implies decreasing 
seigniorage  revenues.  Budget  balance  requires  that  the  government  replies  with  a  new 
increase of money growth rate. The outcome is a new rise of inflation rate and the economy 
begins its evolution from point C on IS1 towards “north-east” direction as shown in figure 2. 
 
The accelerating process of money growth and expected inflation rates begins without having 
an end. Following the rise of money growth rate and the resulting rise of inflation rate, the 
government succeeds in financing its higher budget deficit because expected inflation adjust 
to actual inflation with a certain lag. During that lag the level of real cash balances will be 
higher than that that should prevail if actual inflation would have been correctly expected. As 
expected  inflation  adjusts  to  actual  inflation,  real  cash  balances  decrease,  then  reducing 
seigniorage  revenues.  Budget  balance  requires  the  government  to  proceed  with  an 
accelerating money growth. Seigniorage revenues can be restored but only during the lag 
needed for expected inflation to adjust to actual inflation. The smaller is coefficient  b the 
longer will be this lag. 
 
By starting this process of accelerating money growth and inflation rates leading to monetary 
hyperinflation, public authorities take advantage from the imperfection of expected inflation 
adjustment.  By  misleading  private  agents  systematically  on  their  inflation  forecasts,  the 
government benefits from a higher level of seigniorage that should prevail otherwise. Public 
authorities can then benefit from a higher level of seigniorage than the level d* by triggering 
monetary hyperinflation. 
 
Concerning the design of a stabilisation program, suppose that following a budgetary crisis 
the  economy  experiences  monetary  hyperinflation  and  that  the  decision  of  stabilisation 
happens when the economy has reached point C’ in figure 2. The aim of the government is to 
make the economy return on its initial steady state equilibrium A. Therefore, real budget 
deficit should be reduced to level do.   9 
 
If government succeeds to reduce its deficit from d1 to d0 the economy will jump from C’ to 
C”  on  ISo.  The  escalating  process  of  inflation  and  money  growth  rates  is  immediately 
interrupted. Following the expected inflation rate reached at point C’ and the associated level 
of real cash balances, the reduction of seigniorage needs from d1 to d0 allows the reduction of 
the money growth rate from  ' C q  to ' ' C q . This implies an equivalent reduction of actual inflation 
rate. As expected inflation adjusts gradually to this lower actual inflation, a second stage of 
decrease of money growth and inflation can begin. 
 
As  the  reduction  of  expected  inflation  implies  a  rise  in  real  cash  balances,  it  allows  the 
government to slowdown the growth of the nominal money stock. In terms of figure 2, this 
process  is  illustrated  by  the  evolution  of  the  economy  from  point  C”  to  point  A.  The 
slowdown of monetary growth implies the immediate slowdown of inflation and the lagged 
slowdown  of  expected  inflation.  This  process  goes  on  till  the  economy  has  reached  its 
previous steady-state equilibrium at A where money growth rate, actual and expected inflation 
rates are all equal and remain constant. 
 
 
4 Adaptive expectations and model failure 
 
The case not explored in the literature corresponds to a relatively fast adjustment of expected 
inflation to actual inflation. The case
1 b a
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The framework is the same as previously but dynamics are opposite. The curves IS’o and IS’1, 
represented in figure 3, are iso-seigniorage curves associated, respectively, with government 
budget deficits do and d1 (do<d*<d1). 
 
The same kinds of steady-state equilibria can be shown as those on figure 2. However, their 
dynamic properties are reverse: B’, the high inflation equilibrium is locally stable, whereas 
A’, the low inflation equilibrium, is unstable. In the literature, these properties are known as 
the “high inflation trap” issue. Confronted with the possibility to finance the same budget 
deficit with two different inflation rates the “high inflation trap” refers to the fact that the high 
inflation equilibrium is stable. 
 
Suppose that initially the economy is at point B’ experiencing the high inflation trap. If the 
budget deficit is increased to level d1, the government needs for seigniorage revenues exceed 
the maximum level of seigniorage at steady-state. Therefore, budget balance will be reached 
in a non stationary way. 
 
The rise of budget deficit to d1 implies, in terms of figure 3, the jump of the economy from B’ 
to D on IS’1. Since expected inflation adjust adaptively, ￿e remains, at a first stage, constant 
and the rise of money growth rate respond to the higher budget deficit. 
 
From point D dynamic forces lead the economy to move down in the “south-west” direction 
on iso-seigniorage curve IS’1. Money growth and expected inflation rates start to decline in a   10 
process of continuous decrease of inflation. Buiter (1987) described such a process with the 
term  “hyperdeflation”  when  he  observed  it  within  a  similar  framework  under  rational 
expectations. The operating mechanism is the same in this case as that described by Buiter 
(1987).  In  the  case  of  the  high  inflation  trap,  the  higher  need  of  seigniorage  requires  a 
decrease  of  the  inflation  rate:  this  represents  the  “counter-intuitive”  comparative  static 
properties of the high inflation steady state equilibrium. The operating mechanism relies on a 
higher than unity elasticity of demand for money with respect to money growth rate. The 
process of continuous reductions of money growth and inflation rates allows the government 
to benefit from higher than d* seigniorage revenues relying on this high elasticity of demand 




Figure 3: model failure 
 
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that interpreting the triggering and development of this 
“hyperdeflation” is difficult because of the link between the initial required increase in money 
growth rate and the following triggering of “hyperdeflation”. It is quite easy to understand the 
initial rise of money growth rate, but it is very difficult to explain the fact that this increase 
should be followed by a decline of expected inflation rate. That’s why Bruno and Fischer 
(1987, 1990) wrote, about the “counter-intuitive” comparative static properties of the high 
inflation equilibrium, the following words: 
 
« There is no very good explanation for the initial fall in the inflation rate. Given 
that  the  economy  is  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  Laffer  curve,  a  decline  in  the 
inflation rate is needed to generate more revenue when the deficit rises. »  
 
In Blanchard and Fischer (1989) it is possible to find the same kind of trouble when the 
authors present the monetary model of hyperinflation. Using the work of Bruno and Fischer   11 
(1987, 1990) the authors question the plausibility of adaptive expectations (Blanchard and 
Fischer (1989, note 39, page 209)). Since the rational expectations hypothesis leads to the 
same kind of result this remark isn’t consistent. 
 
Moreover, it isn’t possible to use the explanation suggested by Evans and Yarrow (1981) 
under rational expectations which states that following the rise of real cash balances due to the 
initial acceleration of money growth, instant clearing on the money market requires a decline 
of expected inflation rate. Under adaptive expectations scheme no independent motion of 
expectations can’t happen. Therefore, this “portfolio” approach is not working. Despite this 
difficulty to explain the start of this operating process, there is no place for any monetary 
hyperinflation in this case. 
 
The impossibility of any monetary hyperinflation within this case of the model raises the 
question  of  the  failure  of  the  model  in  its  ability  to  analyse  hyperinflation.  A  better 
understanding  of  this  problem  requires  looking  at  the  reasons  for  the  disappearance  of 
hyperinflation. 
 
We have shown that the triggering and development of hyperinflation are the means used by 
the  government  to  take  profit  from  the  lag  of  expected  inflation  to  actual  inflation.  The 
escalation of money growth and inflation rates allow to systematically mislead the agents on 
the actual values of inflation rates implying a continuous over-evaluation of the real cash 
balances level. The public authorities take benefit from the lag of adjustment of real cash 
balances to their level which should prevail if inflation would be correctly perceived. 
 
The case being analysed here ( 1 ab > ) corresponds to a relatively fast adjustment of expected 
inflation  to actual inflation.  The corresponding  lag  during that the government is able to 
mislead the agents on the actual inflation rates is relatively short and in any case not sufficient 
to be exploited. That’s why there is no place for monetary hyperinflation in this configuration. 
 
This configuration ( 1 ab > ) presents the same dynamic properties as that studied by Buiter 
(1987)  under  rational  expectations.  It  should  be  noticed  that  the  rational  expectations 
hypothesis  is  equivalent  to  the  perfect  foresight  hypothesis  in  a  determinist  environment. 
Under the latter hypothesis there isn’t any lag of real cash balances. Moreover, it is easy to 
verify that the case of perfect foresight is mathematically equivalent to the case of adaptive 
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= - > ￿     ,       (22) 
 
and considering an infinite value for the expectation coefficient b, equation (22) becomes: 
 
0 = p -p
e     ,        (23) 
 
which is exactly the expression of perfect foresight: 
 
p = p
e     .          (24) 
   12 
Since  the  coefficient  b  measures  the  speed  of  adjustment  of  expected  inflation  to  actual 
inflation, the perfect foresight hypothesis is, from a mathematical point of view, equivalent to 
the hypothesis of adaptive expectations without lag. 
 
The analysis carried out in this section shows that the way of forecasting inflation, either 
adaptive or rational, is not the main factor responsible for the failure or the validity of the 
monetary model of hyperinflation. We clearly showed that assuming adaptive expectations is 
not sufficient to obtain hyperinflation in this model. This result is important not only for the 
understanding  of  the  model,  but  also  to  dissipate  the  misunderstanding  present  in  the 
literature.  Evans  (1995,  page  47)  writes,  about  the  failure  of  the  monetary  model  of 
hyperinflation, the following words: 
 
« [...] replacing rational expectations with the assumption of adaptive expectations 
is sufficient to obtain the desired property in the model [...] » 
 
The  current  section  has  clearly  shown  that  it  is  absolutely  not  the  case.  Beyond  the 
specification of the adaptive expectations rule, the main factor for obtaining hyperinflation in 
this model is the lag of real cash balances caused by the latter. Then, when Blanchard and 
Fischer  (1989,  page  201)  state  that  «  quite  crucial  to  the  results  is  the  way  in  which 
expectations  are  formed  »  we  understand  now  that  this  statement  should  be  much  more 
precise.  The  way  in  which  expectations  are  formed  is  important  to  obtain  monetary 




5 Model failure and public budget balance 
 
The configuration  1 ab >  can’t highlight nor explain any monetary hyperinflation as it was 
the case in the configuration 1 ab < . The monetary model of hyperinflation is simple but rich 
in solutions. We continue the analysis of the configuration  1 ab >  by considering the issue of 
stabilisation  policy.  The  aim  is  to  assess  whether  the  model  failure  highlighted  in  that 
configuration  has  any  consequences  in  the  field  of  stabilisation  policy  theory  affecting 
possibly the effectiveness of stabilisation policy. 
 
We take the case previously studied where the economy is on curve IS’1 following the rise of 
real  budget  deficit  to  an  excessive  level  (see  figure  4).  On  this  curve  the  economy  is 
experiencing  a  process  of  continuous  decline  of  inflation  rates.  We  called  this  process 
“hyperdeflation” following Buiter (1987). The question is whether the public authorities may 
be able to put back the economy on a convergent path. 
 
Assume that the decision to stabilise the economy takes place at the precise moment when 
economy reaches point D’ in figure 4. The rise of budget deficit from d0 to d1 being the cause 
of the evolution of the economy on the path IS’1, public authorities may consider to reduce the 
deficit to its previous level d0. Such a measure of public deficit reduction allows the economy 
to return on path IS’0 by jumping from point D’ to point E. At point E the economy is on a 
convergent path leading progressively to the high inflation steady-state equilibrium B’. 
 
Stabilisation policy doesn’t loose its effectiveness to put the economy on a path converging to 
the steady-state equilibrium. However, this result is quite different if one considers a zero 
budget  deficit  policy.  Assume  that  rather  than  reducing  the  deficit  from  d1  to  d0  public   13 
authorities decide to reduce the budget deficit to zero. From the expression of the government 
budget constraint given by equation (6), it follows that a zero deficit implies: 
 
0 q =               (25) 
 
In  the  framework( ) ,
e q p ,  this  budget  constraint  is  represented  by  the  vertical  axis.  The 
dynamics of the configuration  1 ab >  remain determined by (21). 
 
 
Figure 4: budget balance and hyperinflationary bubbles 
 
Consider that when reaching point D’ in curve IS’1 on figure 4 the government implements a 
stabilisation  policy  to  reduce  the  deficit  to  zero.  Such  a  policy  implies  the  jump  of  the 
economy from point D’ to point F. From (21) the dynamic forces operating on the positive 
part of the vertical axis, and at point F in particular, are given by: 
 
0
e p > ￿    .      (26) 
 
The consequence of this drastic policy is the triggering of a process of accelerating inflation. 
The triggering and development of this process happens with a constant nominal stock of 
money according to (25). The path followed by the economy is a hyperinflationary bubble. 
The circumstances around the triggering of the explosive bubble after a period of decreasing 
inflation are unclear. 
 
Registering the shift of inflation evolution, the inflation rates expectations adjust adaptively 
but quite quickly to the new trend of accelerating inflation. Assuming a coefficient a quite 
large (consistent with  1 ab > ), meaning that the demand for real cash balances is very elastic, 
the increase of expected inflation rates implies a huge reduction of desired real cash balances.   14 
As the nominal stock of money is unchanged, this leads to a large excess of real cash balances 
holdings compared to the desired level, implying a big increase in the general price level. This 
leads to a higher rate of inflation. The process goes on and keeps accelerating according to the 
same  scheme. The process  of general  price level increase is amplified from one stage to 
another by joint action of expected inflation rates adjusting quickly to actual inflation rates 
and high elasticity of the demand for money. 
 
The evolution of the economy along a path of hyperinflationary bubble raises the question of 
the design of a possible stabilisation program according to the facts that public budget is 
balanced  and  the  nominal  stock  of  money  is  constant.  The  proposal  made  within  this 
configuration seems as counter-intuitive as is the triggering of the price level bubble. If the 
economy is moving, from point F in figure 4, on the hyperinflationary bubble path, any policy 
aiming at restoring the real deficit d0 will put back the economy on a path converging to the 
high inflation steady-state equilibrium. By using paradoxical measures the government will 
succeed to stop the development of a paradoxical process in a model designed to explain 
monetary hyperinflation. 
 
It  is  necessary  to  stress  that  the  kind  of  hyperinflationary  bubbles  highlighted  in  this 
configuration isn’t any rational bubbles since they have been produced under the adaptive 
expectations hypothesis. The kind of explosive bubbles produced in this configuration is the 
same one as that Cagan (1956) noticed the possibility for in its seminal article. Nevertheless, 
it  should  be  reminded  that  the  work  initially  developed  by  Cagan  didn’t  model  the 
endogenous money supply. Cagan considered the possibility of such explosive bubbles paths 
as the illustration of the capacity of his model to highlight accelerating inflation processes. 
However,  these  paths  didn’t  correspond  to  the  economic  explanation  brought  by  Cagan 
because  the  latter  considered  monetary  hyperinflation.  Some  other  authors  like  Goldman 
(1972) also showed the theoretical possibility of hyperinflationary bubbles by working on the 





This article explores the strict association met in the literature between the monetary model of 
hyperinflation and the hypothesis of adaptive expectations. This association has its origin in 
the problems of the capacity of the model to explain monetary hyperinflation under rational 
expectations. These problems of the validity of the model, highlighted by the articles of Buiter 
(1987) and Kiguel (1989), caused some misunderstandings among economists as it appears 
through the article of Cagan (1987) for the dictionary Palgrave. That led some authors like 
Evans (1995)  to consider the adaptive expectations hypothesis as sufficient to ensure the 
validity of the model. 
 
The analysis of the dynamic properties of the model under adaptive expectations requires the 
distinction of two different configurations. The first configuration corresponds to a relatively 
slow adjustment of expected inflation to actual inflation. This configuration usually treated in 
the literature fully ensures the highlighting and the explanation of monetary hyperinflation. 
Monetary hyperinflation is the result of an excessive public deficit financed through money 
creation. The main underlying operating mechanism relies on the lag of real cash balances to 
actual  inflation.  This  lag  is  caused  by  the  relatively  slow  adjustment  of  inflationary 
expectations to the actual inflation characteristic for this configuration. 
   15 
The second configuration of the model corresponds to a relatively fast adjustment of expected 
inflation to actual inflation. This configuration hasn’t been explored in the literature. Bruno 
and Fischer (1987, 1990) approached this configuration only from the point of view of the 
stability properties of the steady-state equilibria and the high inflation trap issue. They didn’t 
consider  the  consequences  of  an  increase  of  the  public  deficit  beyond  the  steady-state 
conditions. The thorough analysis of this configuration shows that the hypothesis of adaptive 
expectations  is  not  sufficient  to  ensure  the  validity  of  the  model  for  the  explanation  of 
monetary  hyperinflation.  This  configuration  doesn’t  produce  any  monetary  hyperinflation 
when  the  public  deficit  exceeds  the  maximal  value  of  seigniorage  revenues  reachable  in 
stationary situation. A process of continuous decline of the inflation rate takes place. This is 
exactly the same kind of paradox as that of “hyperdeflation” described by Buiter (1987). 
Therefore,  the  way  in  which  expectations  are  formed  is  important  to  obtain  monetary 
hyperinflation in the model, but only because of the sufficient lag for real cash balances it 
may cause. If this lag is not sufficient the model can’t produce monetary hyperinflation. 
 
Within this second configuration the model is valid for neither highlighting nor explaining 
monetary  hyperinflation.  The  failure  of  the  model  in  its  ability  to  explain  monetary 
hyperinflation  brings  the  problem  on  the  field  of  economic  policy  theory.  Public  deficit 
reductions remain efficient to put back the economy on a convergent path when a reduction of 
public deficit to its steady-state level is considered. However, considering a drastic policy of 
zero public deficit shows that this configuration produces hyperinflationary bubbles paths. 
 
The possibility of accelerating inflation processes while the nominal stock of money remains 
constant raises a second aspect of the dysfunction of this configuration of the model. The 
model  has  been  designed  to  explain  monetary  hyperinflation  processes  and  not 
hyperinflationary bubbles. The hyperinflationary bubble process is self-generating and may be 
explained by the joint action of expected inflation rates quickly adjusting to actual inflation 
rates and the high elasticity of the demand for money accelerating the inflation. 
 
The evolution of the economy along a hyperinflationary bubble path raises the question of the 
design of a stabilisation program when public budget is balanced and the nominal stock of 
money is constant. The stabilisation policy proposal made within this configuration seems as 
counter-intuitive as is the triggering of the price level bubble. It has been shown that restoring 
the public deficit to its initial level put back the economy on a convergent path. Therefore, 
that  means  that  by  using  paradoxical  measures  the  government  will  succeed  to  stop  the 
development of a paradoxical process in a model designed to explain monetary hyperinflation. 
 
Hyperinflationary  bubbles  paths  should  be  taken  very  seriously  since  microeconomic 
foundations of the demand for money stress the consistency of such phenomena. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1983, 1986), for instance, showed that hyperinflationary bubbles paths are consistent 






Blanchard O.J. and S. Fischer [1989], Lectures on Macroeconomics, Cambridge, The MIT Press. 
Bruno M. and S. Fischer [1987], «Seigniorage Operating Rules and the High Inflation Trap», NBER Working 
Paper. 
Bruno M. and S. Fischer [1990], «Seigniorage Operating Rules and the High Inflation Trap», The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 105, pp. 353-374.   16 
Buiter  W.  [1987],  «A  Fiscal  Theory  of  Hyperdeflations?  Some  Surprising  Monetarist  Arithmetic»,  Oxford 
Economic Papers, 39, pp. 111-118. 
Cagan P. [1956], «The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation», in M. Friedman (Ed), Studies in the Quantity 
Theory of Money, Chicago, pp. 25-117. 
Cagan P. [1987], «Hyperinflation», in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. 
Choudhry T. [1998], «Another Visit to the Cagan Model of Money Demand: the Latest Russian Experience», 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 17, pp. 355-376. 
Evans J.L. [1995], «The Demand for Money: Hyperinflation or High Inflation Traps», The Manchester School 
Supplement, pp. 40-56. 
Evans J. and G. Yarrow [1981], «Some Implications of Alternative Expectations Hypotheses in the Monetary 
Analysis of Hyperinflations», Oxford Economic Papers, 33, pp. 61-80. 
Georgoutsos  D.A.  and  G.P.  Kouretas  [2004],  «A  Multivariate  I  (2)  Cointegration  Analysis  of  German 
Hyperinflation», Applied Financial Economics, 14, pp. 29-41. 
Goldman S. [1972],  «Hyperinflation and the Rate  of Growth in the  Money Supply»,  Journal of Economic 
Theory, pp. 250-257. 
Kiguel  M.  [1989],  «Budgets  Deficits, Stability  and  the  Monetary  Dynamics  of Hyperinflation»,  Journal  of 
Money, Credit and Banking, 21, pp. 148-157. 
Obstfeld M. and K. Rogoff [1983], «Speculative Hyperinflations in Maximizing Models: Can We Rule Them 
Out», Journal of Political Economy, 91, pp. 675-687. 
Obstfeld  M.  and  K.  Rogoff  [1986],  «Ruling  Out  Divergent  Speculative  Bubbles»,  Journal  of  Monetary 
Economics, 91, pp. 349-362. 
Petrovic  P.,  Z.  Bogetic  and  Z.  Vujosevic  [1999],  «The  Yugoslav  Hyperinflation  of  1992-1994:  Causes, 
Dynamics, and Money Supply Process», Journal of Comparative Economics, 27, pp. 335-353. 
Petrovic  P.  and  Z.  Mladenovic  [2000],  «Money  Demand  and  Exchange  Rate  Determination  under 
Hyperinflation: Conceptual Issues and Evidence from Yugoslavia», Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
32, pp. 785-806. 
Petrovic P. and Z. Vujosevic [1996], «The Monetary Dynamics in the Yugoslav Hyperinflation of 1991-1993: 
the Cagan Money Demand», European Journal of Political Economy, 12, pp. 467-483. 
Slavova S. [2003], «Money Demand During Hyperinflation and Stabilization: Bulgaria, 1991-2000», Applied 
Economics, 35, pp.1303-1316. 
Walsh C.E. [2003], Monetary Theory and Policy, Second Edition, Cambridge, The MIT Press. 1 
 
 






2000–01  Hétérogénéité de travailleurs, dualisme et salaire d’efficience. 
  Francesco DE PALMA, janvier 2000. 
 
2000–02  An Algebraic Index Theorem for Non–smooth Economies. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, janvier 2000. 
 
2000–03  Wage Indexation, Central Bank Independence and the Cost of  Disinflation. 
  Giuseppe DIANA, janvier 2000. 
 
2000–04  Une analyse cognitive du concept de « vision entrepreneuriale ». 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Babak MEHMANPAZIR, février 2000. 
 
2000–05  Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, mars 2000. 
 
2000–06  Sunspots and Incomplete Markets with Real Assets. 
  Nadjette LAGUÉCIR, avril 2000. 
 
2000–07  Common Knowledge and Interactive Behaviors : A Survey. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, mai 2000. 
 
2000–08  Knowledge and Expertise : Toward a Cognitive and Organisational Duality of the Firm. 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Olivier DUPOUËT, Francis KERN, Francis MUNIER, mai 2000. 
 
2000–09  Tie–breaking Rules and Informational Cascades : A Note. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, juin 2000. 
 
2000–10  SPQR : the Four Approaches to Origin–Destination Matrix Estimation for  Consideration by 
the MYSTIC Research Consortium. 
  Marc GAUDRY, juillet 2000. 
 
2000–11  SNUS–2.5, a Multimoment Analysis of Road Demand, Accidents and their Severity in 
Germany, 1968–1989. 
  Ulrich BLUM, Marc GAUDRY, juillet 2000. 
 
2000–12  On the Inconsistency of the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator for Spatial Autoregressive 
Processes. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Agénor LAHATTE, septembre 2000. 
 
2000–13  Turning Box–Cox including Quadratic Forms in Regression. 
  Marc GAUDRY, Ulrich BLUM, Tran LIEM, septembre 2000. 
 
2000–14  Pour une approche dialogique du rôle de l’entrepreneur/managerdans l’évolution des PME : 
l’ISO comme révélateur ... 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Blandine LANOUX, septembre 2000. 
 
2000–15  Diversity of innovative strategy as a source of technological performance. 
Patrick LLERENA, Vanessa OLTRA, octobre 2000. 
 
2000–16  Can we consider the policy instruments as  cyclical  substitutes ? 
  Sylvie DUCHASSAING,  Laurent GAGNOL, décembre 2000. 2 
 
 
2001–01  Economic growth and CO2 emissions : a nonparametric approach. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Phu NGUYEN VAN, janvier 2001. 
 
2001–02  Distributions supporting the first–order approach to principal–agent problems. 
  Sandrine SPÆTER, février 2001. 
 
2001–03  Développement durable et Rapports Nord–Sud dans un Modèle à Générations Imbriquées : 
interroger le futur pour éclairer le présent. 
  Alban VERCHÈRE, février 2001. 
 
2001–04  Modeling Behavioral Heterogeneity in Demand Theory. 
  Isabelle MARET, mars 2001. 
 
2001–05  Efficient estimation of spatial autoregressive models. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, mars 2001. 
 
2001–06  Un modèle de stratégie individuelle de primo–insertion professionnelle. 
  Guy TCHIBOZO, mars 2001. 
 
2001–07  Endogenous Fluctuations and Public Services in a Simple OLG Economy. 
  Thomas SEEGMULLER, avril 2001. 
 
2001–08  Behavioral Heterogeneity in Large Economies. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Isabelle MARET, avril 2001. 
 
2001–09  GMM Estimation of Lattice Models Using Panel Data : Application. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, avril 2001. 
 
2001–10  Dépendance spatiale sur données de panel : application à la relation Brevets–R&D au 
niveau régional. 
  Jalal EL OUARDIGHI, avril 2001. 
 
2001–11  Impact économique régional d'un pôle universitaire : application au cas strasbourgeois.  
  Laurent GAGNOL, Jean–Alain HÉRAUD, mai 2001. 
 
2001–12  Diversity of innovative strategy as a source of technological performance. 
  Patrick LLERENA, Vanessa OLTRA, mai 2001. 
 
2001–13  La capacité d’innovation dans les regions de l’Union Européenne. 
  Jalal EL OUARDIGHI, juin 2001. 
 
2001–14  Persuasion Games with Higher Order Uncertainty. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, juin 2001. 
 
2001–15  Analyse empirique des fonctions de production de Bosnie–Herzégovine sur la période 
1952–1989. 
  Rabija SOMUN, juillet 2001. 
 
2001–16  The Performance of German Firms in the Business–Related Service Sectors : a Dynamic 
Analysis. 
  Phu NGUYEN VAN, Ulrich KAISER, François LAISNEY, juillet 2001. 
 
2001–17  Why Central Bank Independence is high and Wage indexation is low. 
  Giuseppe DIANA, septembre  2001. 
 
2001–18  Le mélange des ethnies dans les PME camerounaises  : l’émergence d’un modèle 
d’organisation du travail. 
  Raphaël NKAKLEU, octobre 2001. 3 
 
 
2001–19  Les déterminants de la GRH des PME camerounaises. 
  Raphaël NK AKLEU, octobre 2001. 
 
2001–20  Profils d’identité des dirigeants et stratégies de financement dans les PME camerounaises. 
  Raphaël NKAKLEU, octobre 2001. 
 
2001–21  Concurrence Imparfaite, Variabilité du Taux de Marge et Fluctuations Endogènes. 
  Thomas SEEGMULLER, novembre 2001. 
 
2001–22  Determinants of Environmental and Economic Performance of Firms : An Empirical Analysis 
of the European Paper Industry. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Phu NGUYEN VAN et Marcus WAGNER, novembre 2001. 
 
2001–23  The policy mix in a monetary union under alternative policy institutions and asymmetries. 
  Laurent GAGNOL et Moïse SIDIROPOULOS, décembre 2001. 
 
2001–24  Restrictions on the Autoregressive Parameters of Share Systems with Spatial Dependence. 
  Agénor LAHATTE, décembre 2001. 
 
2002–01  Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games :  A General Model. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–02  Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games :  Applications. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–03  Partial Certifiability and Information Precision in a Cournot Game. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–04  Behavioral Heterogeneity in Large Economies. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Isabelle MARET, janvier 2002. 
  (Version remaniée du Document de Travail n°2001–08, avril 2001). 
 
2002–05  Modeling Behavioral Heterogeneity in Demand Theory. 
  Isabelle MARET, janvier 2002. 
  (Version remaniée du Document de Travail n°2001–04, mars 2001). 
 
2002–06  Déforestation, croissance économique et population : une étude sur données de panel. 
  Phu NGUYEN VAN, Théophile AZOMAHOU, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–07  Theories of behavior in principal–agent relationships with hidden action. 
  Claudia KESER, Marc WILLINGER, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–08  Principe de précaution et comportements préventifs des firmes face aux risques 
environnementaux. 
  Sandrine SPÆTER, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–09  Endogenous Population and Environmental Quality. 
  Phu NGUYEN VAN, janvier 2002. 
 
2002–10  Dualité cognitive et organisationnelle de la firme au travers du concept de communauté. 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Olivier DUPOUËT, Francis KERN, Francis MUNIER, février 2002. 
 
2002–11  Comment évaluer l’amélioration du bien–être individuel issue d’une modification de la qualité 
du service d’élimination des déchets ménagers ? 





2002–12  The Favorite–Longshot Bias in Sequential Parimutuel Betting with Non–Expected Utility 
Players. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, Marie–Hélène BROIHANNE, février 2002. 
 
2002–13  La sensibilité aux conditions initiales dans les processus individuels de primo–insertion 
professionnelle : critère et enjeux. 
  Guy TCHIBOZO, février 2002. 
 
2002–14  Improving the Prevention of Environmental Risks with Convertible Bonds. 
  André SCHMITT, Sandrine SPÆTER, mai 2002. 
 
2002–15  L’altruisme intergénérationnel comme fondement commun de la courbe environnementale à 
la Kuznets et du développement durable. 
  Alban VERCHÈRE, mai 2002. 
 
2002–16  Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de 
l’eau. 
  Sandrine SPÆTER, Alban VERCHÈRE, juin 2002. 
 
2002–17  Parimutuel Betting under Asymmetric Information. 
  Frédéric KŒSSLER, Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, juin 2002. 
 
2002–18  Pollution as a source of endogenous fluctuations and periodic welfare inequality in OLG 
economies. 
  Thomas SEEGMULLER, Alban VERCHÈRE, juin 2002. 
 
2002–19  La demande de grosses coupures et l’économie souterraine. 
  Gilbert KŒNIG, juillet 2002. 
 
2002–20  Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments with Externality Among Polluters : An 
Experimental Study. 
  François COCHARD, Marc WILLINGER, Anastasios XEPAPADEAS, juillet 2002. 
 
2002–21  Taille optimale dans l’industrie du séchage du bois et avantage compétitif du bois–énergie : 
une modélisation microéconomique. 
  Alexandre SOKIC, octobre 2002. 
 
2002–22  Modelling Behavioral Heterogeneity. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Isabelle MARET, novembre 2002. 
 
2002–23  Le changement organisationnel en PME : quels acteurs pour quels apprentissages ? 
  Blandine LANOUX, novembre 2002. 
 
2002–24  TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND COOPERATION : An analytical framework for a paradigmatic 
approach. 
  Patrick LLERENA, Mireille MATT, novembre 2002. 
 
2003–01  Peut–on parler de délégation dans les PME camerounaises ? 
  Raphaël NKAKLEU, mars 2003. 
 
2003–02  L’identité organisationnelle et création du capital social  : la tontine d’entreprise comme 
facteur déclenchant dans le contexte africain. 
  Raphaël NKAKLEU, avril 2003. 
 
2003–03  A semiparametric analysis of determinants of protected area. 





2003–04  Strategic Market Games with a Finite Horizon and Incomplete Markets. 
  Gaël GIRAUD et Sonia WEYERS, avril 2003. 
 
2003–05  Exact Homothetic or Cobb–Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation. 
  Gaël GIRAUD et John K.–H. QUAH, juin 2003. 
 
2003–06  Relativité de la satisfaction dans la vie : une étude sur données de panel. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Phu NGUYEN VAN, Thi Kim Cuong PHAM, juin 2003. 
 
2003–07  A model of the anchoring effect in dichotomous choice valuation with follow–up. 
  Sandra LECHNER, Anne ROZAN, François LAISNEY, juillet 2003. 
 
2003–08  Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio. 
  Giuseppe DIANA, Moïse SIDIROPOULOS, juillet 2003. 
 
2003–09  Patents versus ex–post rewards : a new look. 
  Julien PÉNIN, juillet 2003. 
 
2003–10  Endogenous Spillovers under Cournot Rivalry and Co–opetitive Behaviors. 
  Isabelle MARET, août 2003. 
 
2003–11  Les propriétés incitatives de l’effet Saint Matthieu dans la compétition académique. 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, septembre 2003. 
 
2003–12  The ‘probleme of problem choice’  : A model of sequential knowledge production within 
scientific communities. 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, Jean–Michel DALLE, septembre 2003. 
 
2003–13  Distribution Dynamics of CO2 Emissions. 
  Phu NGUYEN VAN, décembre 2003. 
 
2004–01  Utilité relative, politique publique et croissance économique. 
  Thi Kim Cuong PHAM, janvier 2004. 
 
2004–02  Le management des grands projets de haute technologie vu au travers de la coordination 
des compétences. 
  Christophe BELLEVAL, janvier 2004. 
 
2004–03  Pour une approche dialogique du rôle de l’entrepreneur/manager dans l’évolution des PME : 
l’ISO comme révélateur … 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Blandine LANOUX, février 2004. 
 
2004–04  Consistent Collusion–Proofness and Correlation in Exchange Economies. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Céline ROCHON, février 2004. 
 
2004–05  Generic Efficiency and Collusion–Proofness in Exchange Economies. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Céline ROCHON, février 2004. 
 
2004–06  Dualité cognitive et organisationnelle de la firme fondée sur les interactions entre les 
communautés épistémiques et les communautés de pratique.. 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Olivier DUPOUËT, Francis KERN, Francis MUNIER, février 2004. 
 
2004–07  Les Portails d’entreprise  : une réponse aux dimensions de l’entreprise «  processeur de 
connaissances ». 





2004–08  Cumulative Causation and Evolutionary Micro–Founded Technical Change  : A Growth 
Model with Integrated Economies. 
  Patrick LLERENA, André LORENTZ, février 2004. 
 
2004–09  Les CIFRE : un outil de médiation entre les laboratoires de recherche universitaire et les 
entreprises. 
  Rachel LÉVY, avril 2004. 
 
2004–10  On Taxation Pass–Through for a Monopoly Firm. 
  Rabah AMIR, Isabelle MARET, Michael TROGE, mai 2004. 
 
2004–11  Wealth distribution, endogenous fiscal policy and growth : status–seeking implications. 
  Thi Kim Cuong PHAM, juin 2004. 
 
2004–12  Semiparametric Analysis of the Regional Convergence Process. 
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Jalal EL OUARDIGHI, Phu NGUYEN VAN, Thi Kim Cuong PHAM, 
 Juillet  2004. 
 
2004–13  Les hypothèses de rationalité de l’économie évolutionniste. 
  Morad DIANI, septembre 2004. 
 
2004–14  Insurance and Financial Hedging of Oil Pollution Risks. 
  André SCHMITT, Sandrine SPAETER, septembre 2004. 
 
2004–15  Altruisme intergénérationnel, développement durable et équité intergénérationnelle en 
présence d’agents hétérogènes. 
  Alban VERCHÈRE, octobre 2004. 
 
2004–16  Du paradoxe libéral–parétien à un concept de métaclassement des préférences. 
  Herrade IGERSHEIM, novembre 2004. 
 
2004–17  Why do Academic Scientists Engage in Interdisciplinary Research ? 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, Thuc Uyen NGUYEN THI, décembre 2004. 
 
2005–01  Les collaborations Université Entreprises dans une perspective organisationnelle et 
cognitive. 
  Frédéric CRÉPLET, Francis KERN, Véronique SCHAEFFER, janvier 2005. 
 
2005–02  The Exact Insensitivity of Market Budget Shares and the ‘Balancing Effect’. 
  Gaël GIRAUD, Isabelle MARET, janvier 2005. 
 
2005–03  Les modèles de type Mundell–Fleming revisités. 
  Gilbert KOENIG, janvier 2005. 
 
2005–04  L’État et la cellule familiale sont–ils substituables dans la prise en charge du chômage en 
Europe ? Une comparaison basée sur le panel européen. 
  Olivia ECKERT–JAFFE, Isabelle TERRAZ, mars 2005. 
 
2005–05  Environment in an Overlapping Generations Economy with Endogenous Labor Supply : a 
Dynamic Analysis. 
  Thomas SEEGMULLER, Alban VERCHÈRE, mars 2005. 
 
2005–06  Is Monetary Union Necessarily Counterproductive ? 
  Giuseppe DIANA, Blandine ZIMMER, mars 2005. 
 
2005–07  Factors Affecting University–Industry R&D Collaboration : The importance of screening and 
signalling. 
  Roberto FONTANA, Aldo GEUNA, Mireille MATT, avril 2005. 7 
 
 
2005–08  Madison–Strasbourg, une analyse comparative de l’enseignement supérieur et de la 
recherche en France et aux États–Unis à travers l’exemple de deux campus. 
  Laurent BUISSON, mai 2005. 
 
 2005–09  Coordination des négociations salariales en UEM : un rôle majeur pour la BCE. 
  Blandine ZIMMER, mai 2005. 
 
2005–10  Open knowledge disclosure, incomplete information and collective innovations. 
  Julien PÉNIN, mai 2005. 
 
2005–11  Science–Technology–Industry Links and the ‘European Paradox’ : Some Notes on the 
Dynamics of Scientific and Technological Research in Europe. 
  Giovanni DOSI, Patrick LLERENA, Mauro SYLOS LABINI, juillet 2005. 
 
2005–12  Hedging Strategies and the Financing of the 1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Fund. 
  André SCHMITT, Sandrine SPAETER, novembre 2005. 
 
2005–13  Faire émerger la coopération internationale  : une approche expérimentale comparée du 
bilatéralisme et du multilatéralisme. 
  Stéphane BERTRAND, Kene BOUN MY, Alban VERCHÈRE, novembre 2005. 
 
2005–14  Segregation in Networks. 
  Giorgio FAGIOLO, Marco VALENTE, Nicolaas J. VRIEND, décembre 2005. 
 
2006–01  Demand and Technology Determinants of Structural Change and Tertiarisation : An Input–
Output Structural Decomposition Analysis for four OECD Countries. 
  Maria SAVONA, André LORENTZ, janvier 2006. 
 
2006–02  A strategic model of complex networks formation. 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, Pascale ROUX, janvier 2006. 
 
2006–03  Coordination failures in network formation. 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, Pascale ROUX, Murat YILDIZOGLU, janvier 2006. 
 
2006–04  Real Options Theory for Lawmaking. 
  Marie OBIDZINSKI, Bruno DEFFAINS, août 2006. 
 
2006–05  Ressources, compétences et stratégie de la firme : Une discussion de l’opposition entre la 
vision Porterienne et la vision fondée sur les compétences. 
  Fernand AMESSE, Arman AVADIKYAN, Patrick COHENDET, janvier 2006. 
 
2006–06  Knowledge Integration and Network Formation. 
  Müge OZMAN, janvier 2006. 
 
2006–07  Networks and Innovation : A Survey of Empirical Literature. 
  Müge OZMAN, février 2006. 
 
2006–08  A.K. Sen et J.E. Roemer : une même approche de la responsabilité ? 
  Herrade IGERSHEIM, mars 2006. 
 
2006–09  Efficiency and coordination of fiscal policy in open economies. 
  Gilbert KOENIG, Irem ZEYNELOGLU, avril 2006. 
 
2006–10  Partial Likelihood Estimation of a Cox Model With Random Effects : an EM Algorithm Based 
on Penalized Likelihood. 




2006–11  Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process. 
 Giuseppe  DARI–MATTIACCI,  Bruno DEFFAINS, avril 2006. 
 
2006–12  Customary versus Technological Advancement Tests. 
  Bruno DEFFAINS, Dominique DEMOUGIN, avril 2006. 
 
2006–13  Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup. 
  Bruno DEFFAINS, Dominique DEMOUGIN, avril 2006. 
 
2006–14  How does leadership support the activity of communities of practice ? 
  Paul MULLER, avril 2006. 
 
2006–15  Do academic laboratories correspond to scientific communities ? Evidence from a large 
European university. 
  Rachel LÉVY, Paul MULLER, mai 2006. 
 
2006–16  Knowledge flows and the geography of networks. A strategic model of small worlds 
formation. 
  Nicolas CARAYOL, Pascale ROUX, mai 2006. 
 
2006–17  A Further Look into the Demography–based GDP Forecasting Method. 
  Tapas K. MISHRA, juin 2006. 
 
2006–18  A regional typology of innovation capacities in new member states and candidate countries. 
  Emmanuel MULLER, Arlette JAPPE, Jean–Alain HÉRAUD, Andrea ZENKER, juillet 2006. 
 
2006–19  Convergence des contributions aux inégalités de richesse dans le développement des pays 
européens. 
  Jalal EL OUARDIGHI, Rabiji SOMUN–KAPETANOVIC, septembre 2006. 
 
2006–20  Channel Performance and Incentives for Retail Cost Misrepresentation. 
  Rabah AMIR, Thierry LEIBER, Isabelle MARET, septembre 2006. 
 
2006–21  Entrepreneurship in biotechnology  : The case of four start–ups in the Upper–Rhine 
Biovalley. 
  Antoine BURETH, Julien PÉNIN, Sandrine WOLFF, septembre 2006. 
 
2006–22  Does Model Uncertainty Lead to Less Central Bank Transparency ? 
  Li QIN, Elefterios SPYROMITROS, Moïse SIDIROPOULOS, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–23 Enveloppe  Soleau et droit de possession antérieure : Définition et analyse économique. 
  Julien PÉNIN, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–24  Le territoire français en tant que Système Régional d’Innovation. 
  Rachel LEVY, Raymond WOESSNER, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–25  Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union Under Alternative Labour–Market Structures. 
  Moïse SIDIROPOULOS, Eleftherios SPYROMITROS, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–26  Robust Control and Monetary Policy Delegation. 
  Giuseppe DIANA, Moïse SIDIROPOULOS, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–27  A study of science–industry collaborative patterns in a large european university. 
  Rachel LEVY, Pascale ROUX, Sandrine WOLFF, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–28  Option chain and change management : a structural equation application. 





2006–29  Prevention and Compensation of Muddy Flows : Some Economic Insights. 
   Sandrine SPAETER, François COCHARD, Anne ROZAN, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–30  Misreporting, Retroactive Audit and Redistribution. 
  Sandrine SPAETER, Marc WILLINGER, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–31  Justifying the Origin of Real Options and their Difficult Evaluation in Strategic Management. 
  Thierry BURGER–HELMCHEN, octobre 2006. 
 
2006–32  Job mobility in Portugal : a Bayesian study with matched worker–firm data. 
  Guillaume HORNY, Rute MENDES, Gerard J. VAN DEN BERG, novembre 2006. 
 
2006–33  Knowledge sourcing and firm performance in an industrializing economy  : the case of 
Taiwan in the 1990s. 
  Chia–Lin CHANG, Stéphane ROBIN, novembre 2006. 
 
2006–34  Using the Asymptotically Ideal Model to estimate the impact of knowledge on labour 
productivity : An application to Taiwan in the 1990s. 
  Chia–Lin CHANG, Stéphane ROBIN, novembre 2006. 
 
2006–35  La politique budgétaire dans la nouvelle macroéconomie internationale. 
  Gilbert KOENIG, Irem ZEYNELOGLU, décembre 2006. 
 
2006–36  Age Dynamics and Economic Growth : Revisiting the Nexus in a Nonparametric Setting.   
  Théophile AZOMAHOU, Tapas MISHRA, décembre 2006. 
 
2007–01  Transparence et efficacité de la politique monétaire. 
  Romain BAERISWYL, Camille CORNAND, janvier 2007. 
 
2007–02   Crowding–out in Productive and Redistributive Rent–Seeking. 
  Giuseppe DARI–MATTIACCI, Éric LANGLAIS, Bruno LOVAT, Francesco PARISI, janvier 
2007. 
 
2007–03  Co–résidence chez les parents et indemnisation des jeunes chômeurs en Europe. 
  Olivia ÉKERT–JAFFÉ, Isabelle TERRAZ, janvier 2007. 
 
2007–04  Labor Conflicts and Inefficiency of Relationship–Specific Investments : What is the Judge’s 
Role ? 
  Bruno DEFFAINS, Yannick GABUTHY, Eve–Angéline LAMBERT, janvier 2007. 
 
2007–05  Monetary hyperinflations, speculative hyperinflations and modelling the use of money. 
  Alexandre SOKIC, février 2007. 
 
2007–06  Detection avoidance and deterrence : some paradoxical arithmetics. 
  Éric LANGLAIS, février 2007. 
 
2007–07  Network Formation and Strategic Firm Behaviour to Explore and Exploit. 
  Muge OZMAN, février 2007. 
 
2007–08  Effects on competitiveness and innovation activity from the integration of strategic aspects 
with social and environmental management. 








2007–09  The monetary model of hyperinflation and the adaptive expectations : limits of the 
association and model validity. 




La présente liste ne comprend que les Documents de Travail publiés à partir du 1
er janvier 2000. La liste 
complète peut être donnée sur demande. 
This list contains the Working Paper writen after January 2000, 1rst. The complet list is available upon 
request. 
 
 
_____ 